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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we explore the cross-national impact of privatization in the network industries on the access to network services. We focus on the 
assessment of the electricity sector in 20 Latin American countries and analyze the time series between 1985 and 2010. To control for the relevance 
of the subsidiarity (social commons) argument we assess the interaction between commodification and the role of the sub-national governments in 
the power sector. Privatization has a statistically significant positive effect on the level of electricity access. In the absence of federalism, 
privatization in the electricity sector has a greater impact on electrification than in the case with federalist government system. Federalism has a 
positive impact on the electricity access if electricity is generated and supplied mainly by the state-owned enterprises. Another interesting finding is 
the relationship between the degree of subsidiarity and electrification: A higher the degree of subsidiarity has a negative effect on the 
electrification. This could be a result of the increasing transaction costs and rent-seeking behavior in the decentralized settings. The study 
complements the existing literature by analyzing the privatization reform from the subsidiarity perspective.
Keywords: Privatization, Federalism, Subsidiarity, Power Sector, Latin America, Commodification 
JEL Classifications: D40, E02, H13, H40, H70, L33, L43, L94
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, public finance crisis and technological advances 
led to network industry reform, consisting in privatization, network 
unbundling and liberalization of the market entry. Latin America 
has been at the forefront of reforming the network industries in the 
context of a larger process of the state reforms. Problems in the 
power sector in most Latin American countries were emanating 
from the defaults on international loans and inability of the public 
supply to meet electricity demands (Wamukonya, 2003). Based on 
the findings of a comprehensive World Bank survey, privatization 
has been identified as the key remedy for the improvement of 
the electricity sector performance (World Bank, 1995). During 
the 1990s, the region attracted 55% of the whole privatization 
investments in developing countries (Chong and Benavidis, 2007). 
The research question of the study is whether the privatization 
of electricity sector in Latin America and the presence of sub-
national governments and municipalities have contributed to 
the increasing level of access to service. The study refers to the 
access to service accounting for both the physical availability of a 
network connection and the financial affordability of consumption 
tariff. We expect privatization to have positive impact on firm 
productivity in the electricity generation and network expansion, 
eventually increasing access to service by meeting unsatisfied 
demand of network connections. However, at the household 
level privatization might have negative impact on the access to 
service through increasing consumption tariff. The reasons are the 
unsuitability of cross-subsidization1 in competitive markets and 
the necessity of the tariff rebalancing, implying cost-reflecting 
price of service (Clarke and Wallsten, 2002, p. 4). Therefore, we 
expected sub-national governments and municipalities to matter 
in complementing the privatization reform through more efficient 
1 Cross-subsidization is the praxis of charging higher prices to the low-
cost and high-income consumers to subsidize high-cost and low-income 
consumers.
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subsidization policy. The widespread belief that the establishment 
of an independent regulation is a sufficient condition to obtain 
positive distributional outcomes omits the key difference between 
the role of regulation and policymaking (Millán, 2007). The sound 
local knowledge of sub-national governments and municipalities 
is an essential component in economic growth policy and might 
help in easing the existing regulatory and policy gaps (Rodrik, 
2004). The study investigates the research question using panel 
data for 20 Latin American countries in the period 1985–2010. 
We find statistically significant effect of privatization on the level 
of access to service. In the absence of federalism, privatization in 
the electricity sector has a greater impact on electrification than 
in the case with federal government system. Federalism has a 
positive impact on the electricity access if electricity generated 
and supplied by public enterprises. Another interesting finding is 
the relationship between the degree of federalism and the access 
to electricity: A higher degree of federalism has a negative impact 
on the electrification. This could be a result of the increasing 
transaction costs of more federalism or the proportionality of 
the size of the sub-national governments with their negotiation 
power with the private energy companies, regulation bodies and 
central governments. An alternative explanation is the utility 
maximization behavior of the local municipal interests represented 
by the subnational governments, trying to appropriate as much 
rents from the electrification activities as possible (Millán et al., 
1987; Millán, 2007).
The study contributes to the existing literature by posing an 
original research question, analyzing the privatization reform from 
a subsidiarity perspective. The study has economic, political and 
developmental relevance. Particularly in the developing countries, 
network industry reform must promote dynamic efficiency, 
referring to sufficient and sustainable provision of service (Kim 
and Horn, 1999). Access to network electricity service might 
increase economic and employment opportunities among poor 
households, increasing their potential income and savings. 
According to McKenzie and Mookherjee the overall welfare gains 
from the new electricity connections skewed primarily towards 
the lowest class of income, since most of the new connections 
have been deployed among poor households (2002). In regards 
to the existing consumers, despite increasing consumption tariffs, 
the average welfare effect is still positive, driven mainly by the 
quality improvements (Andrés et al., 2008).
2. POWER LIBERALIZATION
It is during the 1970s that governments started to notice 
problematics arising from network industries being organized 
as vertically integrated state-owned monopoly or as heavily 
regulated privately owned monopoly. First, the quality of service 
was not keeping pace with technological advances. Second, due 
to asymmetric information, regulators were not able to identify 
the true production costs, hence failing in controlling prices (Shy, 
2001). Third, decreasing public sector productivity and increasing 
fiscal debts pushed governments to rely on market dynamics. The 
public finance crisis combined with huge investment requirements 
and technological advancements in the power generation caused 
a vibrant discussion on the commodification of electricity over 
liberalization of the electricity markets (Byrne and Mun, 2003). 
The public policy paradigm of network industry reform mainly 
consisted in three steps: Privatization; network unbundling and 
separation; and market liberalization (Florio, 2013). The first large-
scale privatization program has been carried out by the Thatcher 
government in the UK, dismantled the monopoly of British 
telecom in 1984 and of British Gas in 1986. Following this trend, 
the process of reform followed in most European countries, Latin 
America and South Asia. West European countries have been able 
to generate the largest share of privatization revenues, which has 
been a response to a large-scale nationalization after the World War 
II. The main drivers have been the increasing financial inefficiency
of state-owned enterprises, the development of financial markets 
and the required market reforms as prerequisite to enter the 
European Union. As an overall trend, West European governments 
have been reluctant in giving up the full control over the public 
utility in over 30% of the privatization contracts, maintaining 
control through voting rights and golden shares. Privatization 
in Eastern Europe has been particularly challenging given the 
economic reform towards market-based economic model. The 
reform reshaped financial market institutions and property rights, 
while trying to obtain social approval. Given the political history of 
Eastern European countries, crucial issues have been the definition 
of managerial compensation, the role of workers’ councils in 
the enterprise, and the restitution of property rights previously 
nationalized between the 40s and the 60s. The privatization 
methods have been contradictory, differentiating between rapid and 
large-scale privatization and a softer approach. African countries 
have been rather slow and reluctant in embracing privatization, 
with public infrastructure and industrial/manufacturing sectors 
remaining under the state control. The reluctance is explained 
by weak institutional settings and a widespread public hostility, 
which might be justified by the scarce empirical evidences 
indicating rent seeking and increasing tariffs of service (Banks, 
2006). Given the lacking institutional quality, privatization has 
not been perceived as the major instrument to incentive economic 
growth. Even if the argumentations of not privatizing state-owned 
enterprises are justifiable, the consequences are still costly. The 
power sector in the South Asia with a slow process of divestiture 
of state-owned enterprises has had increasing financial losses, 
covered by government’s debt at high interest rate. Despite these 
poor performances, public support for privatization remains low, 
with large-scale public sector being perceived as an instrument to 
tackle income inequalities. Also in India, the privatization reform 
started in 1991 has been modest, consisting primarily in selling of 
minority shares of public enterprises. High political competition in 
the country has hindered the privatization reform (Roland, 2008).
2.1. Social Commons Argument
Liberalization of the power sector yielded diverging results 
in different countries. Commodification in Chile, England 
and Wales contributed significantly to the performance of the 
electricity sector. This, nevertheless, is not the case for all of the 
countries commoditizing power sector (Joskow, 2008). Brazil and 
California are the textbook cases where a severe electricity crisis 
emerged as a direct result of the electricity market liberalization. 
Privatization created an artificial scarcity of electricity resulting 
in high rocketing electricity prices (Byrne and Mun, 2003). 
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In Brazil, for instance, commodification caused a 320% price 
increase for customers consuming less than 30kWh per month. 
Large customers, consuming more than 1100 kWh per month, 
nevertheless, did not experience any significant rise of the prices 
(Silva, 2000).
Energy commodification and technological advances opened 
the sector to community-based and lower-scale power plants, 
i.e., decentralization of electricity production. However, this lead to 
the increasing market mergers and acquisitions, yielding increasing 
centralization of the electricity production (Byrne and Mun, 2003). 
Commodification, in the absence of regulation, could also have 
distributional effects since it is achieved at the expense of social 
objectives such as universal access to service (Cremer et al., 1998). 
The immediate implications are the refusal to provide electricity 
service, i.e., “cherry-picking” and “social dumping”, and the stop 
of the subsidization of the electricity tariffs (Guy et al., 1997).
Another important aspect of the power sector liberalization is 
the contradiction of the cost minimization and cornucopianism 
of the private power generation with the targets of sustainable 
environment, climate change and local health considerations in 
the regions where the private companies produce electricity from 
the fossil sources (Byrne and Mun, 2003). According to them, 
the economic logic of the liberalization has to be replaced by 
political discourse - a socio-political space, whereby “a vigorous 
public discourse would require that technology choice, investment 
commitment, social impacts, and ecological implications would 
all be routinely considered in an open access regime of ongoing 
evaluation” (Byrne et al., 2009). By relocating the power sector in 
the social commons the authors try to repeal the limitations of the 
marketplace approach by following a more holistic approach. This 
social commons concept implies more governable and responsive 
power sectors at the community and/or local level (Byrne and Mun, 
2003), which is nothing but a pleading for subsidiarity principle 
in the power sector. In his farsighted analysis on the future of 
the power sector, Fuentes-Bracamontes also underscores the 
importance of the sub-national energy policy (2016). According 
to him, energy policy has no more to be regulated or stabilized 
only at the national level but in the first line on the “local” levels. 
He mentions federal, state, and municipal levels as the alternatives 
for the purely national governance in the times of changing power 
sector and underlying technologies (Fuentes-Bracamontes, 2016).
In contrast to most East Asian and African countries the half 
of the Latin American countries did have a strong element of 
social commons approach in the process of the liberalization of 
the power sector. This is rooted to the long lasting tradition of 
strong subnational governments in form of states, provinces, and/
or municipalities. Hence, it seems to be theoretically interesting 
whether the active participation of the sub-national governments 
enhanced the performance of the electricity sector in terms of per 
capita electricity consumption.
2.2. Privatization of the Electricity Sector in Latin 
America
Latin America has been at the forefront in reforming network 
industries, with each country having its own reasons to proceed 
with privatization. The reforms in the power sector were first 
initiated by Chile in the early 1980s (Dussan, 1996). Foreign 
debt crisis and fiscal deficit were only a part of a larger political 
legitimacy crisis, reflected in the collapse of administration 
apparatus and in high level of corruption (Lora, 2007). Starting 
from the middle 1980s, this multidimensional crisis created 
an environment for heavy and widespread process of state 
reform across Latin America. The process of reform created a 
large consensus to the implementation of neo-liberal economic 
policies able to stimulate competition. Since the late 1980s, 
sectoral economic policies aimed to redefine the role of the state 
in the economy, limiting its forms of intervention and removing 
barriers to private participation in the production activities. 
Public utilities had revealed financially inefficient with excess 
of public employment. Governments were eventually unable to 
sustain the required maintenance and expansion of the network, 
which resulted in poor public services in terms of access rate 
and quality in sectors such as electricity and telecommunication 
(Chong and Benavidis, 2007; Lora, 2007). Privatization was 
expected to alleviate financial burdens and to create government 
revenues, while attracting private investments for the required 
utility performance improvements (Estache and Trujillo, 2013; 
Millán, 2007). Only during the 1990s, Latin America attracted 
55% of the global privatization revenues among developing 
countries (about US$361 billion), with public utilities and 
infrastructure sectors accounting for 75% of the whole amount 
(Chong and Benavidis, 2007). Between 1990 and 1997 the 
majority of the electricity projects with private capital were 
implemented in Latin America (Izaguirre, 1998). 70% of these 
projects were the projects related to electricity generation. These 
projects were responsible for the major shift in the ownership 
structure of the Latin American electricity generation from 
public to private hands (Wamukonya, 2003). Table 1 shows 
the privatization revenues as percentage of GDP across Latin 
American countries in the decade 1990–2000, with Paraguay 
and Peru largely ahead the others. The privatization reform 
has adapted to country-specific economic and institutional 
settings. Governments have been responsible in defining 
selling methods and conditions, attributing weights to each 
political objective, while potentially extracting rents through 
political corruption and favoritisms (Estache and Trujillo, 2013; 
Murillo, 2002). The simplest selling contract refers to full 
divestiture of the incumbent state-owned operator, implying 
Table 1: Privatization revenues as percentage of GDP in 
Latin America, 1990–2000
Paraguay 16.00 Mexico 7.00
Peru 15.00 Jamaica 6.00
Panama 12.00 Trinidad and Tobago 6.00
Bolivia 12.00 Chile 4.00
Argentina 11.00 Colombia 3.00
Guyana 11.00 Honduras 3.00
Brazil 10.00 Nicaragua 3.00
El Salvador 10.00 Barbados 2.00
Belize 9.00 Ecuador 1.00
Guatemala 9.00 Costa rica 0.50
Venezuela, RB 8.00 Uruguay 0.00
Dominican Republic 8.00
The calculations were made using constant 1999 US-dollars. Source: Chong and 
López-de-Silanes (2003)
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government to give up the entire ownership and control of the 
utility. Full divestiture has been the most common approach in 
telecommunication and energy sectors across Latin America. 
A second approach refers to market capitalization, which allows 
governments to stimulate the development of capital markets 
(Estache and Trujillo, 2013). Other types of contract, such as 
concession and public offering of shares preserve a relationship 
between the government and the privatized utility, conducting to 
incentive distortions and unfair efficiency gains redistribution 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
2.3. Privatization and Access to Electricity Services 
Despite the fact that network industries do not fulfill the 
assumptions of welfare economics theorem and competitive 
markets, privatization can have a positive impact on the efficiency 
of production through different channels (Megginson and 
Netter, 2001), which are congruent with institutional economics, 
ownership incentive effects, and agency and public choice 
theory (Boycko et al., 1996; Levy and Spiller, 1996; Niskanen, 
1971; North, 1990). First, privatization would contribute to the 
efficiency of production where government’s intervention has 
not been able to solve market failures. Second, private ownership 
better aligns incentives and defines c lear o bjectives, reducing 
transaction costs. Government’s inability to commit to a single 
objective is inconsistent with welfare efficiency maximization 
(Shleifer, 1998). Third, a major source of production inefficiency 
is the soft budget constraint and subsidy regime of the state-
owned enterprises. Fourth, from a macroeconomic perspective, 
privatization revenues increase government budget and possibly 
government spending, eventually benefiting firms. At the 
microeconomic level, the impact of privatization on access to 
service differentiates between its impact on the affordability 
of consumption tariffs and on the availability of physical 
network connections. The affordability of consumption tariffs 
by households depends upon tariff level and structure imposed 
by the private operators. In turn, private operators would set 
tariff level accounting for market structure and sector regulation, 
with the latter imposing certain criteria in terms of price setting, 
level of required investments in network expansion, subsidy 
scheme and quality standards. While state-owned utility might 
set a tariff lower than the economic cost of provision because 
of public subsidization, private operators might be forced to 
increase tariff level so to achieve financial sustainability. Indeed, 
investment-oriented regulation requires cost-reflective pricing 
and tariff rebalancing, so that the private operators are able to 
maintain, modernize and expand the network (Baldwin et al., 
2012). The expected increases in tariff level depends upon the 
pre-reform conditions and the political choice about efficiency 
gains redistribution (Estache Foster and Wodon, 2001, 2001). 
Concerning physical network connections, if it is true that private 
operators are likely to meet long-term unsatisfied d emand of 
network connections, on the other hand private operators might 
have no incentives in serving unprofitable h ouseholds, s ince 
the costs of providing a network connection is higher than the 
tariff paid (Estache et al., 2001; McKenzie and Mookherjee, 
2002). The main causes are the cost-reflecting pricing and 
the economy of density, which create significant variations in 
the costs of network connection across different areas.
3. FEDERALIST GOVERNMENT
STRUCTURE
The recent World Bank discourse on the good governance moved 
from the concept of “minimal” state intervention in the markets 
towards more functional concepts of “effective” and “un-intrusive” 
state (World Bank, 1997). The discourse aims at a redefinition 
of power concentration within the state, advocating greater 
decentralization of power in policymaking and public service 
provision for a more responsive state intervention (World Bank, 
1997). The concept of “un-intrusive” state reverses the enormous 
expansion of the size and scope of the state (Wagle and Dixit, 
2007), i.e.,, praising subsidiarity and/or federalist government 
structures.
Despite the fact that the role of federalist government structure in 
the outcome of the privatization was insufficiently addressed in the 
economic literature, it seems to be unambiguous that privatization 
process like any other political change is shaped by the features 
of the political system. The role of the sharing of power of the 
national (central) government with the entities such as states 
and provinces, i.e., federalism has to be considered as a possible 
indicator in the success of the privatization. Especially in the Latin 
American context, the issue of power sharing plays a decisive role 
in the process of privatization where the half of the states/provinces 
have authority over taxes, spending and legislation. Given that 
privatization reform shifted the objective of universal access 
to service to private operators through legislation, taxation and 
subsidies (Florio, 2013; Newbery, 1997), sub-national governments 
and municipalities play a decisive role in its achievement. Indeed, 
privatization reform has reshaped the market structure of network 
industries, leading to obstacle in implementing within-firm cross-
subsidization (Clarke and Wallsten, 2002). Hence, government’s 
intervention is still required to maximize the number of access 
to service by implementing a non-distortionary, inexpensive and 
competitively neutral subsidization policy (Clarke and Wallsten, 
2002). Therefore, the well-functioning system of sub-national 
governments and municipalities appears to be a well-designed 
instrument in addressing situations where the critical issue is 
the low level of access to service (Lora, 2007). Especially in the 
context of the Latin America, it has to be emphasized that federal 
state governments and municipalities play the decisive role in 
the process of the regulation of the power sector. Due to the 
constitutions of the federalist Latin American states the federal 
bodies play a way higher role in the process of the privatization 
than the national bodies (Bouille et al., 2001; Kucinski, 1995; 
Zhang et al., 2008).
According to the principle of subsidiarity, centralized regulation 
should perform exclusively tasks that cannot be performed at a local 
level. For example, centralized regulation must coordinate with 
sub-national governments in organizing auctioning bids for service 
provision by private operators (Ugaz and Waddams, 2003). The 
intuition is that sub-national governments are relatively 
efficient in implementing demand-driven subsidization policy, 
minimizingtargeting errors and financial inefficiency to not-
elected recipients. Subsidizing the demand-side has three 
advantages (Ugaz and Waddams, 2003). First, it does not distort 
competition. Second, it allows pricing to reflect the scarcity of 
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the resources. Third, it supports the access to service among 
vulnerable demographic groups, such as children or 
disadvantaged. In support of the hypothesis is the statement 
made in (Rodrik, 2004): “Successful reforms are those that 
package sound economic principles around local capabilities, 
constraints and opportunities. Since these local circumstances 
vary, so do the reforms that work. An immediate implication is 
that growth strategies require considerable local 
knowledge.” Demand-driven subsidization policy could partly 
solve the well-known regulatory inability to redistribute 
privatization efficiency gains in Latin America fairly. Millán 
(2007) pointed out how Latin American governments have for 
too long been convinced that the key component of successful 
network industry reform was the establishment of a quality and 
independent regulator, forgetting the essential difference 
between the role of regulation and policymaking. The idea of 
sub-national authorities as key component of network industry 
reform comes from the water sector experience, characterized 
by a large number of isolated and heterogeneous firms, and 
from the Chilean experience of subsidization. The Chilean rural 
electrification program required central government to allocate 
financial resources to regional and local authorities to finance 
and subsidize network expansion or alternative electricity 
sources. For telecommunication, the Chilean government 
established a telecommunication development fund which 
enabled a demand-driven subsidization of the consumers. The 
regulatory challenges and policy gaps in promoting access to 
service indicate the essential role of the local knowledge (Foster 
et al., 2000; Estache, 2005).
4. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
In this section, we address whether the degree of federalism 
matters for the outcome of privatization measured in the access 
to the electricity in Latin America. To this end, we estimate 
a specification following the general approach in Balza et al. 
(2013). The major difference between our estimation and 
the specification in Balza et al. (2013) is the presence of the 
federalism-variables in our estimation. In addition, we did not 
include the autonomous regulator variable in our specification 
due to the fact that in 15 countries in the database the process 
of privatization relied on autonomous agencies and in the 5 of 
them (Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay and Venezuela) on 
the independent consultancy and blueprints of the multilateral 
agencies (Wamukonya, 2003). Thus, it is not plausible to assume 
that the countries without autonomous regulation agency in the 
process of privatization would differ from the countries relying on 
the consultancy of the supranational or independent consultancy 
bodies. Hence, the resulting specification is:
lnYit=B0+B1*PRIVit+B2*FEDi+B3*PRIVit+FEDi+X’B+d(i)+uit
With i referring to country and t to time. Y is the dependent variable 
to proxy access to service and it is introduced as natural logarithm. 
PRIV represents the explanatory variable of privatization, while 
FED is the indicator of sub-national governments or federalism. 
PRIV#FED refers to the interaction term between the indicators 
of privatization and sub-national governments, so to capture the 
complementary effects. X is the vector of control variables. d(i) 
represents country fixed effects, different across countries but 
constant across years, while u represents the errors term. As already 
mentioned above, the research question of the study is tested 
using panel data for 20 Latin American countries for the period 
1985–2010. Since we do not have the privatization data for all the 
years in the data set, the panel data is unbalanced.
Concerning the interpretation of the results, in econometric models 
with interaction terms the coefficients do not reflect the total 
average impact of interest, rather a conditional effect. In our model, 
the privatization coefficient reports the impact of privatization in 
the absence of federalist government system, while the federalism 
indicator indicates the impact of federalism in the absence of 
privatization. Eventually, the interaction coefficient shows the 
changes in the privatization impact between having or not having 
a federalist government system.
4.1. Methodological Limitations
Previous surveys have raised the issue of endogeneity in the 
privatization studies (Arin and Ulubaşoglu, 2009; Gupta et al., 
2008, Roland, 2008). Particularly, it is possible that the utility 
performance shows a problem of causality with the choice of 
privatize, with poorly performing utilities likely to be privatized 
earlier and in larger extent than better performing firms. IV-
variables are the commonly used remedies to deal with the 
issue of reverse causality. However, it is hard to identify a 
proper instrument and collect reliable data in case of network 
industries (Jamash et al., 2005). Despite these considerations, 
endogeneity does not raise an econometric problem and can 
be ignored when analyzing electricity sectors in Latin America 
given the large extent of privatization reform (Andrés et al. 2008). 
Country-fixed effects might also capture most of the country-
specific propensity to reform as well as the country-specific 
constitutional, legal, economic, and political aspects (Cubbin 
and Stern, 2006). Endogeneity due to reverse causality could 
also be raised by per capita income (PCI) in the long run, since 
increasing PCI might result from increasing access to service 
(Zhang et al., 2008). However, because of the relatively high initial 
coverage rate in Latin American electricity sectors, the increasing 
electricity consumption might have been directed mostly towards 
‘consumptive’ use of energy by households rather than towards 
“productive” use of energy, which were more likely to receive 
the required amount of electricity supply prior to privatization. 
Hence, the increasing electricity consumption has not been directed 
towards new income generating activities.
5. DATA
In investigating the level of access to network service, literature 
often rely on coverage rate or output indicator. Coverage rate 
indicates the number of households with a network connection 
or the number of network connections per 100 inhabitants. 
Output indicator indicates instead the level of aggregate output 
of service. Given the definition of access to service used in this 
study, accounting for both the physical availability of a network 
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connection and the affordability of consumption tariffs, the output 
might be a more proper indicator in capturing both dimensions. 
The most common output indicators to proxy access to electricity 
service refer to the electricity generation capacity or per capita 
electricity consumption. However, the limitations are multiple. 
The increasing production or consumption might be captured by 
existing consumers, hence overestimating the actual level of access 
to service. Contrarily, at constant level of per capita consumption 
together with demand-management policies (for example 
economic efficiency) or decreasing level of distributional losses, 
the indicator would underestimate the increase in the actual level 
of access to service. The data on the electric power consumption 
(kWh per capita) are compiled by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), it refers to electricity consumption per capita (kWh). It is 
defined as the production of power plants and combined heat and 
power plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation 
losses and own use by heat and power plants (OECD/IEA, 2014).
The data on the years of privatization reforms and the percentage 
of private ownership in the electricity generation is provided in 
Balza et al. (2013) and its updating in Millán (2007), based on 
the information from Ministries’ and Regulators’ reports, and 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). The data is available for the year 2001, 2006, and 2010. 
Because of the limited availability of privatization data the study 
assumes constant values for missing observations (years) and full 
effectiveness of the reform, without accounting for transitional 
period.
In investigating the role of sub-national governments and 
municipalities, the study decides for an indicator referring to the 
presence of political and fiscal federalism. It reports whether the 
country states/provinces/municipalities have an authority over 
taxing, spending, or legislation related to privatization in the power 
sector. It is constructed as a dummy variable, taking value 1 if any 
of these three categories is present, and it is time constant for each 
country. It is taken from the database of political institutions 2015 
(Cruz et al., 2016) and is available for 12 countries for each year, 
resulting in 305 observations. Having fiscal or political federalism 
might indicate a higher level of effectiveness and competence 
in the local governance, however increasing transaction costs. 
A limitation of the indicator is the missing information about the 
quality of sub-national governance.
We further investigate the degree of federalism by an indicator 
referring to the number of municipalities divided by the 
total population of the country, hence deriving the degree of 
decentralization. The data on the number of municipalities are 
taken from Rosales and Carmona (2008).
A set of control variables have been included. GDP per capita 
(constant US dollar in natural logarithms) and Poverty Headcount 
Ratio at $1.90 a day (2011, PPP) (% of population) are taken from 
the world development indicators (WDI) 2016 and are proxies for 
individual demand of public services, then inducing higher level 
of investment in production capacity. Population density (natural 
logarithms of people per sq. km of land area) is also taken from 
the WDI and is a proxy for the cost of service provision (World 
Bank, 2016). According to the concept of economy of density, 
high population density decrease the cost of service provision, 
requiring lower investments in network expansion. Index of 
economic and political freedom is introduced to capture political 
and institutional factors. The index of economic freedom is a 
10-point index developed by the Fraser Institute, indicating 
Table 2: Description of the dependent and independent variables
Variable Description/transformation Source
Electric power 
consumption (kWh per capita)
Natural logarithms of the electric power 
consumption per capita 
International Energy Agency (IEA)
Privatization (PRIV) Percentage of private ownership in electricity 
generation
Ministries’ and Regulator’s reports and ECLAC
Federalism Dummy variable, differentiating between 
Latin American countries with and without 
sub-national units (states, provinces or 
municipalities) having an authority over taxing, 
spending, or legislating related to the process of 
the privatization in the electricity generation and/
or distribution 
Database of Political Institutions (Cruz, Keefer & 
Scartascni, 2016)
Size of municipal unit Number of the municipalities divided by the total 
population
Rosales and Carmona, 2008
Population density Natural logarithms of people per sq. km of land 
area
World Development Indicators, 2016
PCI Natural logarithm of GDP per capita (constant 
USD)
World Development Indicators, 2016
Poverty headcount ratio Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 
PPP) (percentage of population)
World Development Indicators, 2016
Economic freedom 10-point index indicating increasing economic 
freedom as the index increases
The Fraser Institute, 2017
Polity 7-point index indicating decreasing political 
rights as the index increases
Freedom House, 2016
IEA: International Energy Agency, ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, PCI: Per capita income
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increasing economic freedom as the index increases. It accounts 
for five areas: The size of government, legal structure and security 
of property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade 
internationally and regulation of credit, labour and business. The 
index of political freedom is a 7-point index developed by freedom 
house, indicating decreasing political rights as the index increases. 
It accounts for the features of the electoral process, political 
pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. The 
following Table 2 summarizes the dependent and independent 
variables used in the study.
6. RESULTS
Table 3 reports the panel estimation results of the study. 
Privatization has a positive and significant impact on the level 
of access to electricity services in each model specification. 
1% increase in the share of the private ownership in electricity 
generation causes at least 0.299 and maximum 0.821% increase 
in the electricity consumption per capita. In estimation equation 
(7), for example, using robust random effects panel data, in 
the absence of federalist government system 1% increase in 
electricity privatization increases access to electricity service by 
0.679%, while decreasing its impact to 0.131% in the presence of 
federalist government system. In the scenario of public electricity 
generation and supply, federalist government system has a positive 
and significant impact on the electrification. Another interesting 
crosscutting finding in the estimation equations (5), (6) and (7) is 
the relationship between the degree of subsidiarity and electricity 
consumption, whereby we use the size of the municipality as 
a proxy for the degree of subsidiarity: The higher the degree 
of subsidiarity as the size of the municipal unit the worse is 
the access to electricity services. This finding corroborates the 
observation in Millán (2007), which shows rather descriptively 
that with the increasing number and negotiation power of the 
sub-national government entities in the process of the power 
sector liberalization lead to substantial increase of the transaction 
costs at least in Brazil, Colombia and El Salvador. Population 
density in contrast, has a statistically significant positive impact 
on the access to the electricity services (eq. (4)). Higher level of 
Economic Freedom (eq. (6)) and more political rights (eq. (7)) also 
correspond with a higher access to the electricity services. Poverty 
headcount ratio has a statistically significant negative impact on 
the electricity consumption. Nevertheless, due to the small value 
of the coefficient (−0.009) it has a lower impact on the average 
consumption than the other variables in the specifications.
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